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FULL CHARACTERISATION OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL 
ADJUSTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH MUNICIPALITIESa 
 
Antoni Castells, Alejandro Esteller, Maite Vilaltab,c 
 
ABSTRACT: By means of a dynamic panel data analysis, and using a database from 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona (1993-99), we describe their process of fiscal 
adjustment to a shock in tax capacity. About 25% of the shock is internalized through an 
increase in tax effort, 35% through a reduction in public expenditure (mainly investment), while 
the rest is covered by an increase in the level of debt (i.e., the adjustment is delayed). However, 
this process of adjustment is very much influenced by the political situation of the municipality. 
Coalition and minority governments (“weak” governments) tend to delay the (unavoidable) 
adjustment, and 70% of their shock is covered by an increase in the level of debt, while the rest 
of municipalities (“strong” governments) adjust immediately. Leftist governments mostly react 
through increases in tax effort, while rightist governments reduce public expenditure to a greater 
extent. Finally, we find that municipalities are relatively reluctant to decrease taxes, that is, they 
react differently to a negative (28%) and a positive (26%) shock with regard to the level of tax 
effort. 
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RESUMEN: Mediante un análisis dinámico de un panel de datos, y utilizando una base de datos 
de municipios de la provincia de Barcelona (1993-99), describimos el proceso de ajuste fiscal 
ante un shock de capacidad fiscal. Alrededor de un 25% del shock es internalizado a través de 
un incremento del esfuerzo fiscal, un 35% a través de una reducción del gasto público 
(básicamente inversión), mientras que el resto es cubierto a través de un incremento del stock de 
deuda (i.e., el ajuste fiscal es aplazado). Sin embargo, este proceso está altamente influenciado 
por la situación política del municipio. Los gobiernos de coalición y de minoría (gobiernos 
"débiles") tienden a retrasar el (inevitable) ajuste, de forma que hasta un 70% de sus shock son 
cubiertos mediante un incremento del stock de deuda, mientras que el resto (gobiernos 
"fuertes") se ajustan inmediatamente. Los gobiernos de izquierda reaccionan principalmente 
mediante aumentos en el nivel de esfuerzo fiscal, mientras que los gobiernos de derecha reducen 
aún más su nivel de gasto público. Finalmente, los municipios se muestran relativamente reacios 
a disminuir el nivel de presión fiscal, esto es, respecto de la variación en el nivel de esfuerzo 
fiscal, los municipios reaccionan menos ante un shock negativo que ante uno positivo (28% vs. 
26%).  
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1. Introduction 
How does a local government react in front of a negative shock in its level of tax 
revenues? Does it immediately adjust its budget by increasing its level of tax effort 
and/or decreasing its level of expenditure? Or does it instead tend to delay the fiscal 
adjustment, incurring a deficit? These are the main questions we will address in this 
paper using a database of Spanish municipalities in the province of Barcelona for the 
period 1993 to 1999. Moreover, following the literature on political economy, we will 
test to what extent the political context affects the type of fiscal adjustment, i.e. 
according to this strand of the literature, we would expect a different adjustment 
between leftist and rightist governments, between “weak” and “strong” governments, or 
depending on whether the shock occurs in an electoral year or in any other year.  
This type of hypothesis has mainly been applied to the central or intermediate layer of 
government (see Heyndels and Van Driessche, 2002 for a recent exception, applied to 
Flemish municipalities,). It therefore also seems interesting to apply it to the closest 
layer of government to the citizens, that is, local government. The closeness of this layer 
of government to citizens increases the transparency of the public sector activities, and 
the very process of accountability improves due to the greater importance of the welfare 
of each citizen in deciding the result of the next electoral contest (Seabright, 1996). In 
fact, there ist some empirical evidence in favor of greater accountability by sub-central 
governments (e.g., Lederman et al., 2001; de Mello and Barenstein, 2001). We would 
therefore expect that “bad policies” (e.g., an excessive delay in the unavoidable fiscal 
adjustment1) were less likely in this layer of government, or that the electoral process 
was useful in accounting for the performance of the incumbent (relatively more so than 
for non-local governments) (Barro, 1973).  
We will attempt to fully characterize the process of fiscal adjustment, both on the 
revenue side (tax effort and deficit) and on the expenditure side (current and capital 
expenditure). This full characterization will permit us to discern which budgetary 
components are used more often in the case of a shock. For example, on the expenditure 
side, we would expect a greater reduction in capital expenditure than current 
                                                 
1 Brender (2003) has found empirical evidence for the Israeli local governments that a larger current 
deficit significantly reduces the probability of re-election of the local incumbent. 
3 
expenditure, due to the greater discretional nature of the former (Inman, 1995; Rattso, 
1999). But it will also help us to identify whether our empirical results are fully 
consistent with those expected by the literature. For example, the literature predicts that 
“weak” governments incur relatively higher deficits, which stems from their relatively 
greater propensity to spend due to a “common-pool” problem (Velasco, 1997). The 
hypothesis concerning no-majority governments would have been verified (Perotti and 
Kontopoulos, 2002) only if those two results (higher level of deficit and of expenditure) 
simultaneously held. Furthermore, our empirical technique (dynamic panel data) will 
take the possibility of a sluggish adjustment of certain budgetary components into 
consideration. That is, in the analysis of the fiscal adjustment, we will differentiate 
between short run and long run responses, as some political or economic constraints 
might impede the local government to instantaneously achieve the desired variation in 
the level of certain budgetary components in order to overcome the shock2.  
 
Graph 1: Shocks of Local Potential Tax Revenues
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Note: Group 1: municipalities with a number of inhabitants below 5,000 
(N=41); Group 2: population between 5,001 and 20,000 (N=39); Group 3: 
population between 20,001 and 50,000 (N=13); Group 4: population between 
50,001 and 100,000 (N=5); Group 5: number of inhabitants above 100,001 
(N=6). All monetary amounts are expressed in 1999 ptas. 
                                                 
2 See again Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002), p. 197, who stress the importance of introducing dynamics in 
these empirical analyses. 
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Usually, tax bases in the hands of local governments are very stable throughout the 
economic cycle. In Graph 1, the standard deviation of potential tax revenues (i.e., tax 
capacity) is shown throughout the period 1993-993 (municipalities are aggregated by 
population size; while the potential level of tax revenues is calculated each year 
multiplying the average tax base of each group of municipalities by a global average tax 
rate throughout the entire period, so the tax rate does not have any impact on the 
evolution of potential tax revenues. Finally, to calculate the total value of potential tax 
revenues, we simply total the value obtained for each tax). However, as can be checked 
from the graph, for the municipalities included in our database, the evolution of their tax 
bases shows a downturn from 1993 till 1996, followed by a brief, but remarkable, 
upturn that seems to start collapsing in 1998. During this period, the coefficient of 
variation of potential tax revenues for the smallest group of municipalities is 6.36%, 
while for the biggest municipalities, it is 14.23% (although the lower level of 
representativeness of this latter group of municipalities, N=41 vs. N=6, respectively, 
must be taken into account4). The period of analysis therefore seems especially suitable 
for testing the process of fiscal adjustment, as there is some variability in the level of tax 
bases, and this was also a period of local economic downturn and upturn. 
Dealing with sub-central governments also embodies a peculiarity that has to be taken 
into account. That is, we might wonder to what extent the intergovernmental grant 
system stabilizes any shock suffered by local governments. As long as there existed a 
properly designed intergovernmental grant system, the level of local (potential) tax 
revenues would be totally or partially stabilized around a reference level. In Graph 2, we 
thus present the standard deviation of local revenues calculated taking into account both 
the amount of potential tax revenues and revenue coming from the unconditional current 
grant system from the central government. As can be observed from the graph, these 
grants do not stabilize at all. In fact, it seems that they tend to act slightly pro-cyclically. 
It therefore makes sense to focus the analysis of the process of fiscal adjustment on the 
reactions carried out exclusively through the budget of local governments. 
                                                 
3 As we will see, according to our empirical technique, this will be the definition of shock that we will 
deal with. 
 
4 In Spain the size of the municipalities is very small, this situation is so-called “local fragmentation”. For 
instance, according to Bosch et al. (2003), 86.2% of the municipalities have less than 5,000 inhabitants, 
while only 0.7% have more than 100,001 inhabitants. 
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Graph 2: Shocks of Local Potential Revenues
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According to our empirical analysis, after a decrease in tax capacity, local governments 
reduce public expenditure by 35%, taxes increase by 25%, while the rest of the shock 
(40%) is overcome by means of an increase in the level of debt. However, the political 
situation of the municipality strongly determines that adjustment process. Those 
governments holding a majority of seats in the Town Council carry out the necessary 
fiscal adjustment immediately, since their level of debt hardly increases, and tend to 
reduce their level of public expenditure (81%) to a greater extent, which is basically 
capital expenditure (57%). Other governments tend to delay the (unavoidable) 
adjustment, since they mostly use debt to neutralize the shock (62%). We also find 
differences between leftist and rightist governments, since the former tend to react much 
more by means of increases in taxes (30%) than the latter (18%). Finally, although not 
directly related with the political situation, we find that municipalities react 
asymmetrically with respect to the level of tax effort, depending on whether they face a 
positive or a negative shock in tax capacity. Our results therefore show a certain 
reluctance by the municipalities to decrease taxes after a positive shock, since in 
absolute values that reaction is smaller than in the case of a negative shock.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the main 
hypotheses concerning the political economy of fiscal adjustment. In section 3, we 
develop our empirical framework, and show the results of the empirical analysis. 
Finally, in section 4, we conclude. 
 
2. Related literature on the political economy of fiscal adjustment   
As far as the political economy of fiscal adjustment is concerned, we will focus on the 
potentially different reactions between leftist vs. rightist governments, electoral year vs. 
non-electoral year, and weak vs. strong governments (see Alesina et al., 1998, for a 
relatively recent review of these issues). 
Leftist vs. Rightist Governments 
According to the hypothesis of "partisan preferences", we should observe permanent 
differences in the level of the fiscal variables established by the municipalities according 
to their political orientation (see Hibbs, 1977; and the recent review and empirical 
analysis by Boix, 2000). There might also be a different reaction to a shock depending 
on the political orientation of the government. Leftist governments probably attach a 
lower weight to the marginal cost of taxation, and so after a negative shock in their level 
of tax capacity, tend to react more strongly by means of an increase in the level of tax 
effort than rightist governments do. The latter type of government might instead react 
by means of reductions in their level of expenditure, to which they probably confer a 
relatively lower weight in their objective function. The empirical results by Tavares 
(1999) tend to confirm this hypothesis of differential reactions. Finally, there is mixed 
evidence on whether right-wing governments are less deficit-prone than left-wing ones 
(Boix, 2000; Volkerink and de Haan, 2000; and Sápir and Sekkat, 2002 find empirical 
evidence confirming such hypothesis, while Alesina et al., 1998, do not), and there does 
not seem to be any significant difference in their ability to carry out successful fiscal 
adjustments (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). In our empirical analysis, though, we will not 
test the degree of success of a fiscal adjustment.  
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According to the traditional hypothesis of "partisan preferences" (see also Boix, 2000, 
for more elaborated hypothesis), we should thus observe a relatively greater level of 
public expenditure, and a greater level of tax effort and/or higher level of debt in the 
case of leftist governments5. But we will also test the hypothesis that leftist (rightist) 
governments, after a negative shock, tend to react more (less) on the revenue side (tax 
effort and increases in the level of debt) than on the expenditure side. Finally, we will 
test whether there is a delay in fiscal adjustment depending on the political orientation 
of the government, i.e., whether the volume of debt issued after an adverse shock 
depends on the political orientation of the government. 
Electoral Year vs. Non Electoral Year 
During or just before the electoral year, we should observe a convergence of the 
political platforms, and the establishment of expansive policies by the incumbent - i.e., 
either an increase in the level of public expenditure, or a decrease in the level of tax 
effort, or a combination of both, and so, ceteris paribus, a relatively greater budget 
deficit than in any other period - in order to increase its chances of re-election 
(Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976)6. This creates the well-known political business 
cycle. On the other hand, according to this approach, it seems reasonable to assume that 
after an adverse shock, we should observe a relatively smaller increase in tax effort and 
so a greater deficit in an electoral year, i.e. we would expect a delay in the fiscal 
adjustment.  
With respect to the empirical test of the political business cycle, as Persson and 
Tabellini (2002) state, there are not conclusive results in the case of fiscal policy (see 
also the critical review by Drazen, 2000). According to those authors, this is mainly due 
to the fact that empirical analyses have mostly focused on monetary policy and to the 
fact that they have not been systematic enough. In any case, they conclude that there is 
                                                 
5 If the possibility of "strategic behavior" by the political parties is considered, the basic result concerning 
the issue of debt might reverse. In particular, if a rightist (leftist) party fears losing the next electoral 
contest, it will issue more (less) debt in order (not) to curtail the chances of spending of the leftist 
(rightist) party when it reaches the government (Persson and Svensson, 1989). See Petterson-Libdom 
(2001) for a favorable test of this hypothesis. 
 
6 Even if there are "partisan preferences", the predicted convergence in expansionary policies might occur 
as long as the incumbent is uncertain about its chances of re-election (Wittman, 1977), though credibility 
problems about the post-election period might impede the convergence of the political platforms in the 
case of "rational voters" (Alesina, 1988). 
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certain evidence regarding the manipulation of fiscal policy before elections. In 
particular, Drazen (2000) points out to the opportunistic use of fiscal transfers to 
individuals before the elections by incumbents. Finally, with regard to the fiscal 
adjustment, Poterba (1994) finds that spending cuts and tax increases after an adverse 
shock are smaller in US states when governors are about to stand for election. There is 
thus some evidence of a delay in fiscal adjustment after adverse shocks during the 
electoral period (see also Persson and Tabellini, 2002, p. 10). 
During or just before the "electoral year" we should therefore observe common behavior 
by the incumbents regardless of their political orientation, and they all should carry out 
expansionary fiscal policies (i.e., greater budget deficits). Finally, according to this line 
of reasoning, we should observe a longer delay in the process of fiscal adjustment after 
an adverse shock. 
Also related with the electoral period are the so-called electoral accountability models 
(the origins being Barro, 1973, and Ferejohn, 1986; see also Besley and Case, 1995), 
according to which, due to the impossibility of writing a contract between voters and 
parties that binds the latter to good performance while in office, the elections are useful 
in creating incentives for good performance of the incumbent when it runs for re-
election7. This strand of the literature predicts a lower level of "rents" in the 
incumbent’s hands just before or during the elections, since then the incumbent aims at 
maximizing her chances of re-election8. As long as we interpret (part of) current 
expenditure as "rents" for the incumbent, we should observe a lower level of current 
expenditure and, as in the case of the classical "political business cycle" models, a lower 
level of tax effort just before or during the electoral period. With regard to the process 
of adjustment after an adverse shock, the reaction probably depends on the perception of 
the voters with respect to the characteristics of the shock. If they consider it is a 
common shock (and so it is not due to a particular bad performance by the incumbent), 
there should not be any difference compared to a non-electoral year. However, if it is a 
specific shock (this is the situation we will deal with in our empirical analysis due to the 
inclusion of a set of time effects), it seems reasonable to postulate that citizens will ask 
                                                 
7 Their normative implications are therefore, totally different from those on "electoral cycles". 
 
8 The greater the value attached to the possibility of re-election in comparison with the utility that could 
be enjoyed from the current appropriation of “rents”, the greater the expected reduction in rents. 
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for a fast fiscal adjustment, mostly through a another decrease in (“wasteful”) spending. 
In the presence of asymmetric information about the "talent" of the incumbent, and 
supposing that voters aim at electing the most competent politician, the hypothesis that 
arises to be empirically tested is that just before or during the electoral period, public 
expenditure should be increased, while tax rates should be cut (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; 
Rogoff, 1990). This is the so-called signaling competence model. This model therefore 
offers the same empirical predictions as the classical analysis of the "political business 
cycle". In this case, the explanation is that by incurring a deficit during or just before the 
electoral period the incumbent supposedly signals his/her ability to (easily) rebalance 
the public budget after the electoral contest. According to this hypothesis, after a 
negative shock in tax capacity during or before elections, we should observe a smaller 
decrease in public expenditure and/or a smaller increase in tax rates, and on the whole a 
delay in the (unavoidable) stabilization - which is not free of economic costs - until after 
the elections. In this way, voters will be able to infer the competence of the politicians, 
who are tempted to show off their ability in managing adverse budgetary shocks. 
Two other models are therefore compatible with unusual behavior by the incumbent 
during the electoral year with totally different empirical predictions. The electoral 
accountability model predicts lower levels of expenditure and a faster process of fiscal 
adjustment, while the signaling competence model predicts higher levels of expenditure 
and a slower process of fiscal adjustment (like the "opportunistic model"). 
Weak vs. Strong Governments 
Finally, there is the hypothesis that the degree of fragmentation of the government will 
crucially affect its fiscal responsibility. Basically, two different hypotheses stand out 
(see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapter 13). The first one deals with a "common 
pool" problem. As long as the government consists of different parties (i.e., the 
government is a coalition of political parties, or the incumbent is governing in minority, 
and has to look for sporadic agreements with other political parties), they all will share a 
given level of net assets (i.e., tax capacity of the municipality). However, in forming 
their expenditure needs, each of the n members of the coalition will merely internalize 
1/n of the marginal cost of its decision, while the marginal benefit will fully accrue to 
the coalition group. That is, each member of the coalition will underestimate the real 
10 
cost of raising funds to carry out additional expenditure. This hypothesis therefore 
predicts that regardless of the state of the economy, the level of public expenditure will 
be higher the greater the fragmentation of the government, which on average must 
produce greater budget deficits (Velasco, 1997)9.    
The second hypothesis that arises in relation to the fragmentation of the government 
predicts a delay in fiscal stabilization after a negative shock. In this case, although the 
delay embodies economic costs (among others, a higher financial cost of debt and thus 
even higher taxes in the future), each member of the coalition attempts to make the costs 
of the (unavoidable) fiscal stabilization fall on the other/s member/s of the coalition 
(i.e., the necessary increase in taxes or the necessary decrease in public expenditure). 
This hypothesis thus predicts a delay in the stabilization, and so higher levels of deficit 
in the short run after an adverse shock (Alesina and Drazen, 1991).  
Roubini and Sachs (1989) were the first authors to obtain empirical evidence of the 
impact of "political fragmentation" on the level of public expenditure and public deficit. 
They measured fragmentation by means of a variable that reaches its maximum value 
for those governments in minority and the minimum value for one-party majority 
parliamentary governments, and obtained significant evidence that the weaker the 
government (i.e., the higher the value of the qualitative variable) the greater the public 
deficit. Later, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) found that the empirical results by Roubini and 
Sachs (1989) were merely showing the effects of minority governments. Their 
interpretation of that result was that "... it is harder to negotiate in parliament than 
within a government" (p. 1597). However, Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) have 
recently cast doubt on the basic results by Roubini and Sachs (1989), since the former 
found that the results of the latter were due to the fact that fragmented governments 
exerted a lower level of taxation, while theory predicts higher levels of public 
expenditure (Velasco, 1997). 
The empirical results checking the effects of fiscal fragmentation are quite sensitive to 
the measurement of fragmentation, especially when the original coding suggested by 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) is used. In contrast with the previous empirical results cited, 
                                                 
9 There exists some evidence that those periods of acute financial crisis act as catalysts to reform in 
reducing the budget deficits, and so they should not be feared too much (Drazen and Grilli, 1992). 
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de Haan and Sturm (1997) and de Haan et al. (1999) found that the type of government 
was not a relevant variable in explaining government debt growth or government 
spending levels. Both papers reached this conclusion by correcting certain mistakes in 
the previous empirical analysis, using another data set and trying other definitions of 
"political fragmentation". As we have commented before, more recently Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002) have confirmed the results by Haan and Sturm (1997) and de Haan 
et al. (1999). The results with respect to the effect of political weakness on the growth 
of public debt and public expenditure are therefore not clear-cut and depend very much 
on how “fragmentation” is measured. In our case, we will adopt a broad measure of 
"fragmentation" (as we do not have any other piece of information about whether local 
governments govern in minority or in coalition), merely differentiating between those 
parties that hold by themselves a majority of seats in the parliament ("strong") and the 
rest ("weak").  
However, none of the empirical analyses quoted distinguish between the delay in the 
fiscal adjustment and the higher level of public expenditure due to a "common pool" 
problem. Nevertheless, as a main difference with all the previous papers, Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002) - apart from a dummy variable indicating the degree of "political 
fragmentation" - have also included an interaction between their index of fragmentation 
and a variable identifying an adverse shock (identified by means of an increase in the 
unemployment rate). They anticipate that the greater the degree of fragmentation, the 
greater the impact of a negative shock on the public deficit, since they argue that during 
"bad times" the composition of the government is expected to be more relevant. 
Nevertheless, we are tempted to interpret this interaction as an empirical contrast of the 
hypothesis of "delayed stabilization". That is, the estimate of the interaction would take 
into account how a government reacts after a negative shock depending of its degree of 
political weakness. This is the approach we will follow in our empirical analysis. 
On the whole, we will test whether the degree of fragmentation of the political 
governments has any influence on both the level of public expenditure and on public 
deficit, and also on the process of fiscal adjustment after a negative shock. In our case, 
the negative shock will be identified as a fall in the level of tax capacity, while we will 
use a very simple measure of political fragmentation - a dummy variable equal to one 
for all those parties in government that do not hold a majority of seats in the parliament 
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(and so have to form a coalition or governing in minority) and zero otherwise. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
Under conditions of a negative shock in the level of potential tax revenues (i.e. tax 
capacity), a municipality will be forced either to decrease its level of public services, or 
to increase its level of tax effort, or to incur a budget deficit (and so delaying the 
budgetary adjustment), or to carry out a combination of all these fiscal policies. In this 
section, we aim to describe how the adjustment occurs by means of an econometric 
analysis, and whether this depends on the political situation of the municipality.  
3.1. Empirical framework  
In order to fulfill this purpose, we will estimate three equations: one for the decision 
concerning the level of expenditure (differentiating between current and capital 
expenditure), one for the level of tax effort, and one for the variation in the level of debt 
(i.e., for the budget deficit). These will be the endogenous variables in our empirical 
analysis. Given that all the budgetary decisions are presumably simultaneously adopted, 
the set of fiscal decisions – current and capital expenditure, tax effort and deficit - could 
be estimated by means of a simultaneous equation system. However, instead of 
adopting that econometric strategy, we have decided to formulate and estimate a 
reduced form of each one of the three equations. This implies that each one of the 
equations will have to be specified for all the exogenous variables of the model.  
In order to set up the equations to be estimated, we initially adopt a very simple tax 
setting behavior in which the level of each component of the budget is chosen from the 
maximization of the welfare of a representative citizen (e.g., the "median voter"). 
According to this simple tax setting behavior, we should therefore find that the 
optimally chosen level of each budgetary variable is such that the marginal benefit of 
public good provision (current and capital expenditure) equals the marginal cost of 
exerting a higher level of tax effort and the marginal cost of raising the level of public 
debt. This relationship must also respect the budget constraint. The exogenous variables 
to be included in each one of the equations must therefore be related to (i) the marginal 
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benefit of public good provision; (ii) the marginal cost of exerting a higher level of tax 
effort; and (iii) the marginal cost of incurring in a budget deficit. The explanatory 
variables that have been included in order to attempt to account for all these factors are 
the following: 
 Tax Capacity (TC): if the level of tax effort is kept unchanged, a greater level of tax 
capacity increases the amount of tax revenues. Nevertheless, as long as the marginal 
utility of local public goods is decreasing, we would expect a reduction in the level 
of tax effort (i.e., part of the increase in tax revenues is returned to the citizens), 
unless there is fiscal illusion, or the marginal cost of public funds is decreasing in 
tax capacity (rich citizens are willing to suffer from higher levels of tax effort and/or 
from higher increases in the level of debt, which obviously means higher taxes in 
the future). The lower the marginal utility of public goods, the greater should be the 
reduction in tax effort and/or in the level of debt and consequently the lower the 
increase in public expenditure. 
Tax Capacity is the key variable in our empirical analysis, as it is the source of the 
shock to the budget of local governments. Thus, the rest of explanatory variables 
included in the empirical analysis have to be considered as control variables.  
 Current grants (CG): we would expect the same sign as in the case of a variation in 
tax capacity, unless there is fiscal illusion. In this latter situation (this is the so-called 
"flypaper effect"), we should observe a greater increase in public expenditure than in 
the case of an increase of the same amount in tax revenues, and thus a smaller 
reduction in the level of tax effort and/or in the variation of the level of debt 
(Courant et al., 1979; Oates, 1979). 
 Capital grants (KG): this type of conditional transfer might require the recipient 
government to co-fund part of the investment. Given this characteristic, the expected 
sign of this variable with regard to each component of the budget is ambiguous. If 
the capital grant does not need co-financing, we would expect a positive effect on 
expenditure, and/or negative on the level of tax effort and/or on the variation of the 
level of debt (i.e . a greater amount of general resources, which were previously 
allocated to investment decisions, are now available either to spend, to reduce the 
level of tax effort and/or reduce the level of indebtedness). However, as long as the 
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capital grant implies the need for co-funding, the estimate of capital expenditure 
should also be positive, but strictly greater than one, while the sign of the resource 
variables (tax effort and/or public deficit) should be positive.  
 Population (Pop), Density (Dens): the variable Population is commonly employed 
as an indicator of expenditure needs. However, given that the amount of the main 
unconditional current grant allocated to each municipality (known as the 
"Participación Municipal en los Tributos del Estado"; hereafter the PMTE) is 
basically calculated from the population share, and its weight is increasing in the 
amount of population (see previous section), the estimate of the variable Population 
could also be taking the effect of this variable on the share of the PMTE into 
account. The square of population has been introduced in order to control for the 
possibility of scale economies (see, for the Spanish case, Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 
2002)10. The variable Density - number of inhabitants by km2 - has been included in 
the econometric specification, as another potential indicator of expenditure needs. 
The expected greater expenditure needs reflected by those two variables should 
therefore force the municipalities to exert a higher level of tax effort and/or to incur 
a deficit, unless the unconditional transfers (basically, the PMTE) have properly 
accounted for the cost impact of these factors in their formulation. 
 Income (Inc): this variable aims at including the preferences of each municipality - 
through the average income - with regard to public good provision. We would 
therefore expect a non-negative sign of the estimate of this variable with regard to 
public expenditure. Then, if public goods are really normal goods, we should also 
obtain a positive sign of this estimate with respect to tax effort and/or to the 
variation in the level of public debt. 
Although the fiscal setting behavior we have in mind is related to the welfare 
maximization of a representative agent, there is no doubt that (optimal) fiscal decisions 
are adopted within a diverse political context - i.e., these decisions might also be 
influenced by the existence of partisan preferences, an “electoral cycle” or might 
depend on whether the government is either “weak” (i.e., it governs in minority or by 
                                                 
10 In fact, in the empirical estimation, we have increased the degree of the polynomial function as long as 
the introduction of a higher degree was statistically accepted. As we will show, we have therefore finally 
accepted the polynomial function of the variable "Population" to be of degree 4. 
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means of a coalition) or “strong” (it holds a majority of seats even without the need of 
forming a coalition). In the next section, we broaden the set of (traditional) explanatory 
variables concerning fiscal decisions in order to take into account the potential impact 
of the political context.  
3.2. Empirical implementation 
According to the explanations given in the previous section, the basic equation to be 
estimated is the following: 
itti1-it10
it87654
itititit
TFE           
IncDens Pob Pob Pob Pob           
KGCGTCE
µβ
ββββββ
βββ
++++
+++++++
+++=
9
432
321
 [1] 
This basic model will be estimated for each of the five endogenous variables (total 
expenditure: E; capital expenditure: KE; current expenditure: CE; tax effort: TXE; and 
public deficit: DEF). In expression [1], we have used endogenous variable total 
expenditure as an example. All the monetary variables are expressed in ptas. and p.c. 
terms. In the first row, the variables picking up the flow of resources of the local 
government, tax capacity (TC), current grants (CG) and capital grants (KG) appear. Tax 
capacity (TC) is also expressed in ptas., and has been calculated as follows: 
∑
=
=
3
1j
ijtjit BtTC  [2] 
In order to construct the variable TC, we have considered the three main taxes in the 
hands of the Spanish municipalities (the property tax, the tax on economic activity and 
the vehicles tax). For example, in year t for the municipality i we have calculated for 
each j-tax the amount of revenue that could be collected if it applied a standard tax rate 
( jt ) - calculated as the average of the period - on its tax base (Bijt). By totalling all these 
three amounts, we obtain the potential tax revenue of municipality i in year t, precisely 
as expressed in [2], which by definition only depends on the level of the j-tax bases of 
municipality i in t. However, as it is already multiplied by a standard tax rate, it is easier 
to interpret how a variation in tax capacity affects the budget of the municipality. 
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In the second row, those variables concerning expenditure needs (Pop and Dens) and 
the preference for public good provision (Inc) are shown. Finally, in the third row, we 
include the lagged dependent variable in order to account for a sluggish adjustment of 
the endogenous variable after a variation in any of the exogenous variables. For 
example, after an exogenous variation in the amount of capital grants, the short run 
response of total expenditure is 3β , while in the long run (once 1−= itit EE ), the 
response is )( 103 1 ββ − . As a result, as long as we expect costs of adjustment to the 
new situation, 010 >β . The greater the value of 10β , the greater the adjustment costs. 
We have also included a set of fixed (Fi) and time effects (Tt), while itµ is the standard 
error term of the empirical estimation.  
With regard to the endogenous variables, Tax Effort (TEX) has been calculated as 
follows: 
∑
=
=
3
1j
jijtit BtTEX  [3] 
The level of tax effort of municipality i with respect to the j-taxes in year t is thus 
calculated supposing that the municipality has the average tax base in each tax, jB  (also 
calculated as the average of the period). In this way, year-to-year changes in the level of 
tax effort only depend on the variation of the statutory tax rates enacted by the 
municipality in each one of the j-taxes. However, as it is multiplied by a standard tax 
base, it again makes it easier to interpret the whole process of fiscal adjustment. 
Given that current and capital transfers enter the normal definition of public deficit, 
which is an endogenous variable in our model, but at the same time both types of 
transfers are exogenous variables (i.e., in the equation of the deficit, in principle such 
variables appear both on the right-hand side and left-hand side), in order to carry out the 
empirical analysis we have had to redefine public deficit excluding those two variables. 
With respect to the equation in which deficit is the endogenous variable, we will thus 
obtain the following: 
...KGCGTCDEF itititit +++= 321 βββ  [4] 
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where DEFit does not include the value of the transfers. In order to obtain the normal 
definition of public deficit, we will therefore have to subtract CGit and KGit on both 
sides of expression [4], that is, 
...KG)(CG)(TC)KGCGDEF( itititititit +−+−+=−− 11 321 βββ  [5] 
Operating in this way, we obtain the normal definition of public deficit on the left-hand 
side of expression [5]. On the whole, in order to obtain the impact of current and capital 
transfers on the level of public deficit, we will have to subtract 1 of the estimates 2β and 
3β , respectively. 
As we justified in section 2, fiscal decisions of the municipality might also be 
influenced by the political context. The basic model will then be modified as follows: 
ittiit13it1-it11
it98765
ititititititit
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KGCG)]D(TC[)DTC(E
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++++++
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 [6] 
On the one hand, we therefore permit a differential reaction of the municipality after a 
variation in the level of tax capacity according to its political situation. In particular, the 
dummy variable, itD , will account for the following dichotomies: weak vs. strong 
governments, election year vs. non-election year, and left-wing governments vs. right-
wing governments. But we will also test whether the municipality responds differently 
after a negative shock (decrease in tax capacity) than after a positive shock (increase in 
tax capacity). On the other hand, we will also permit the political context to affect the 
level of the budgetary variables. In particular, we have introduced a dummy for leftist 
governments (Left) and another one for those governments in minority or that govern in 
coalition (Weak); the potential effects of the electoral cycle on the level of the fiscal 
variables will be included in the time effects, although given that these will also be 
picking up other factors that vary year to year but equally for all the municipalities, it 
would be too risky to infer any conclusion from them about the fiscal impact of the 
electoral cycle. 
In expressions [1] and [6], the exogenous variables appear in levels, while we aim at 
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characterizing the fiscal adjustment after a shock in tax capacity. However, as we have a 
panel data, and given the presence of municipal fixed effects, each exogenous variable 
may be interpreted as its deviation from municipal averages along the period of analysis 
(e.g., see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, p. C26; or Mélitz and Zumer, p. 270-1, 
equations [5] and [6]). Alternatively, other papers have defined the shock in tax 
revenues as the difference between the amount of budgeted tax revenues and the amount 
in fact collected (Poterba, 1994; Rattso, 1999); while other authors have opted to 
estimate a explanatory time series equation of tax revenues (e.g., Heyndels and Van 
Driessche, 2002). In our case, given that we do not have data about the amount of tax 
revenue budgeted and the period of analysis is so short, we think the approach adopted 
to measure shocks in tax revenue is the most reasonable. 
 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (T=7; N=104) 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tax Capacity 30.222,36 9.598,81 11.601,48 75.015,52 
Tax Effort 27.186,89 4.210,70 16.916,68 41.432,42 
Total Expenditure  90.580,98 26,332,80 33.394,09 261.735,07 
Current Expenditure 64.306,94 14.899,68 30.626,98 128.871,07 
Capital Expenditure 26.274,04 20.990,96 244,36 167.985,07 
Deficit 39.147,25 43.090,07 10.636,32 129.917,33 
Current Grants 21.617,18 4137,92 12.346,30 37.597,48 
Capital Grants 9.227,07 10921,14 0 103.878,21 
Population (*10-3) 22,07 42,77 0,60 268,84 
Density 1.600,75 3.205,32 13,60 21.680,64 
Income 1.731.281,13 260.773,83 1.101.460,76 2.865.128,27
Left 0,48 0,50 0 1 
Weak Government 0,49 0,50 0 1 
Note: all monetary units are expressed in p.c. terms and in ptas. of the year 1999; 
Source: Servei d'Informació Econòmica Municipal (SIEM) (Diputació de Barcelona). 
 
The presence of the lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand side of expressions 
[1] and [6] makes the OLS estimator seriously biased and inconsistent, unless t tends to 
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infinity (Nickell, 1981). The bias and inconsistency are due to the correlation of the 
lagged dependent variable with the individual specific effects. Given that the time 
period of our panel is very short, those problems must be taken into account. In order to 
tackle this situation, we will use the method proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
which is specially suitable for short dynamic panels. This method consists of, firstly 
taking the differences of between models [1] and [6] (so we lose one year, 1993), and, 
secondly, following the example of public expenditure, using itE (or for t>1, all 1−itE ) as 
an instrument of the differenced-lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. 
Table 1 shows the Statistics Summary of all the variables that we will employ in the 
empirical analysis. 
3.3. Empirical results 
The results of the empirical analysis are shown in Tables 2 to 9. We describe the main 
results concerning each one of the estimated equations separately: 
 Public Expenditure (Tables 2, 3 and 4): in Model 1 of Table 2, we present the 
results of the basic model for total expenditure (the structure is the same for all the 
tables). We can check that public expenditure is positively related with tax capacity. 
The estimate is 0.342, while for current grants, it is much greater, 0.697, though the 
former is not statistically significant and the latter is only significant at the 90% 
confidence level. There thus emerges certain evidence of a "flypaper effect". Neither 
density nor income p.c. nor population have a statistically significant impact on 
public expenditure p.c., while capital grants have an important positive impact, 
1.062, which indicates a certain degree of co-financing (for each 1 pta. of capital 
grants received by the municipality, it has to add 0.062 ptas. from its own resources 
for the investment project). The signs and values of all these variables are very 
similar in all the other models in Table 2, so they will not be commented on again. 
As expected, the estimate of the lagged value of the dependent variable is positive, 
though very small (0.099), and remains almost unchanged in all the rest of models. 
This suggests low costs of adjustment towards the (intertemporally) optimal level of 
public expenditure. 
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TABLE 2: TOTAL EXPENDITURE (N*T= 648) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Tax Capacity 0.3425 
(1.199) 
0.3407 
(1.193) 
-.- -.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (+) -.- -.- 0.273 
(0.914) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (-) -.- -.- 0.244 
(0.761) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Strong Govt. -.- -.- -.- 0.807 
(2.334)*** 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Weak Govt. -.- -.- -.- 0.133 
(0.435) 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Election -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.709 
(2.338)*** 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * NElection -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.222 
(0.774) 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * Left -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.215 
(0.639) 
Tax Capacity * Right -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.475 
(1.347) 
Current Grants 0.6967 
(1.782)* 
0.7095 
(1.815)* 
0.7189 
(1.834)* 
0.739 
(1.898)* 
0.541 
(1.375) 
0.701 
(1.797)* 
Capital Grants 1.062 
(13.249)***
1.064 
(13.274)***
1.069 
(13.253)***
1.055 
(13.183)*** 
1.051 
(13.178)*** 
1.062 
(13.270)***
Pop  836.866 
(0.183) 
1,055.032 
(0.230) 
1,288.170 
(0.280) 
3,697.143 
(0.800) 
-157.958 
(-0.034) 
911.517 
(0.199) 
Pop2  -15.361 
(-0.196) 
-24.166 
(-0.306) 
-26.840 
(-0.338) 
-45.737 
(-0.577) 
-1.221 
(-0.015) 
-24.276 
(-0.308) 
Pop3 0.096 
(0.217) 
0.151 
(0.340) 
0.163 
(0.366) 
0.225 
(0.505) 
0.034 
(0.076) 
0.153 
(0.345) 
Pop4  -0.0002 
(-0.234) 
-0.0003 
(-0.364) 
-0.0003 
(-0.385) 
-0.0004 
(-0.470) 
-0.0001 
(-0.124) 
-0.0003 
(-0.368) 
Density -4.499 
(-0.229) 
-2.582 
(-0.131) 
-2.531 
(-0.128) 
-5.407 
(-0.276) 
0.509 
(0.026) 
-2.181 
(-0.111) 
Income -0.004 
(-0.289) 
-0.004 
(-0.313) 
-0.004 
(-0.308) 
-0.003 
(-0.215) 
-0.005 
(-0.389) 
-0.004 
(-0.327) 
Left -.- 1,912.165 
(0.444) 
1,810.38 
(0.419) 
1,340.353 
(0.312) 
1,466.052 
(0.342) 
9,316.317 
(0.783) 
Weak Govt. -.- -2,009.666 
(-0.560) 
-2,044.80 
(-0.569) 
17,593.206 
(1.787)* 
-1,463.690 
(-0.409) 
-2,163.062 
(-0.603) 
T95 4,417.660 
(1.942)* 
4,390.447 
(1.932)* 
4,341.407 
(1.906)* 
4,020.602 
(1.774)* 
-8,989.073 
(-1.965)** 
4,465.003 
(1.965)** 
T96 576.992 
(0.226) 
1,118.197 
(0.420) 
1,011.108 
(0.377) 
840.985 
(0.317) 
1,659.618 
(0.625) 
1,190.878 
(0.447) 
T97 5,402.737 
(1.620) 
5,976.279 
(1.743)* 
5,911.573 
(1.720)* 
5,467.851 
(1.601) 
6,979.148 
(2.039)** 
6,097.320 
(1.778)* 
T98 9,589.08 
(1.671)* 
10,184.769
(1.758)* 
10,286.085
(1.773)* 
9,070.391 
(1.573) 
11,671.849 
(2.021)** 
10,383.641
(1.792)* 
T99 16,409.29 
(3.407)*** 
16,907.951
(3.474)*** 
17,207.836
(3.522)*** 
15,452.122 
(3.187)*** 
1,987.727 
(0.306) 
17,117.276
(3.513)*** 
Total Expenditure (-1) 0.099 
(1.993)** 
0.100 
(2.021)** 
0.102 
(2.050)** 
0.101 
(2.041)** 
0.121 
(2.441)*** 
0.097 
(1.968)** 
Adj.-R2 0.2670 0.2684 0.267 0.274 0.278 0.270 
Note: *: 90% significant; **: 95% significant; ***: 99% significant 
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In Model 2, we have included a dummy variable to control for “partisan 
preferences” (dummy equal to 1 for leftist governments), and another one to control 
for the effects of “political fragmentation” (dummy equal to 1 for “weak” 
governments), but none of them is statistically significant. In Model 3, we have 
tested whether the municipalities react differently to a positive shock than to a 
negative shock in their level of tax capacity. The estimates obtained indicate that 
there is no statistically significant difference (we will try to be more precise on this 
issue later on).  
In Model 4, we allow for a differential reaction depending on the degree of 
“political fragmentation”. In this case, we find that after an adverse shock in tax 
capacity, “strong” governments reduce their level of public expenditure until the 
reduction in tax revenue is almost fully compensated for (0.807), while other 
governments react much less (0.133), with only the first estimate being statistically 
significant. Moreover, when we allow for this differential reaction, we also find that 
the dummy variable that identifies “weak” governments becomes statistically 
significant. According to this latter variable, “weak” governments tend to spend 
about 17,600 ptas. p.c. more than “strong” governments. As far as non-majority 
governments are concerned, both the theory predicting a delay in stabilization and 
the theory predicting greater levels of expenditure are therefore confirmed.     
In Model 5, we have tested whether the reaction to an adverse shock is different 
during the electoral year. Our results certainly detect a differential reaction. After an 
adverse shock, there is a relatively more important decrease in public expenditure 
during the electoral period (0.709) - being statistically significant - than in any other 
year (0.222) - which is not statistically different from zero. It thus seems that 
governments become more accountable the closer the electoral contest. However, 
this result must be cautiously taken into account, since we only have two electoral 
contests (1995 and 1999). The robustness of this result should thus be checked once 
we have more electoral periods available. Finally, in Model 6, we do not detect a 
differential reaction according to the political color of the local government. 
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TABLE 3: CURRENT EXPENDITURE (N*T= 648) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Tax Capacity 0.070 
(1.144) 
0.069 
(1.139) 
-.- -.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (+) -.- -.- 0.047 
(0.747) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (-) -.- -.- 0.036 
(0.539) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Strong Govt. -.- -.- -.- 0.190 
(2.564)*** 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Weak Govt. -.- -.- -.- 0.016 
(0.244) 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Election -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.105 
(1.591) 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * NElection -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.058 
(0.940) 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * Left -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.083 
(1.155) 
Tax Capacity * Right -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.054 
(0.713) 
Current Grants 0.402 
(4.791)*** 
0.399 
(4.749)*** 
0.403 
(4.793)*** 
0.408 
(4.911)*** 
0.378 
(4.388)*** 
0.400 
(4.751)*** 
Capital Grants 0.003 
(0.198) 
0.004 
(0.217) 
0.005 
(0.294) 
0.001 
(0.077) 
0.002 
(0.141) 
0.004 
(0.220) 
Pop  -5,628.429
(-5.722)***
-5,735.486 
(-5.814)*** 
-5,614.145
(-5.638)***
-5,147.013 
(-5.195)***
-5,763.478 
(-5.787)*** 
-5,712.821 
(-5.771)*** 
Pop2  81.235 
(4.848)*** 
82.922 
(4.915)*** 
81.506 
(4.810)*** 
76.999 
(4.574)*** 
84.107 
(4.935)*** 
82.846 
(4.909)*** 
Pop3 -0.402 
(-4.279)***
-0.413 
(-4.350)*** 
-0.407 
(-4.271)***
-0.389 
(-4.124) 
-0.419 
(-4.375)*** 
-0.413 
(-4.347)*** 
Pop4  0.001 
(3.972)*** 
0.001 
(4.050)*** 
0.001 
(3.985)*** 
0.001 
(3.891)*** 
0.001 
(4.073)*** 
0.001 
(4.047)*** 
Density -0.221 
(-0.052) 
-0.029 
(-0.007) 
-0.037 
(-0.009) 
-0.455 
(-0.109) 
0.097 
(0.023) 
-0.073 
(-0.017) 
Income 0.003 
(1.214) 
0.003 
(1.179) 
0.003 
(1.179) 
0.004 
(1.320) 
0.003 
(1.074) 
0.003 
(1.190) 
Left -.- 467.668 
(0.504) 
435.271 
(0.470) 
380.096 
(0.414) 
414.893 
(0.444) 
-373.741 
(-0.146) 
Weak Govt. -.- 752.498 
(0.970) 
760.932 
(0.982) 
5,838.316 
(2.808)*** 
837.495 
(1.068) 
769.266 
(0.989) 
T95 2,937.084 
(5.896)*** 
2,959.868 
(5.933)*** 
2,940.415 
(5.900)*** 
2,843.030 
(5.754)*** 
1,735.103 
(1.769)* 
2,955.268 
(5.917)*** 
T96 3,798.182 
(6.664)*** 
3,675.750 
(6.143)*** 
3,631.857 
(6.044)*** 
3,663.646 
(6.191)*** 
3,667.209 
(6.084)*** 
3,660.931 
(6.095)*** 
T97 6,048.272 
(8.069)*** 
5,928.099 
(7.670)*** 
5,892.764 
(7.615)*** 
5,880.506 
(7.694)*** 
5,933.445 
(7.617)*** 
5,902.481 
(7.591)*** 
T98 8,962.314 
(6.946)*** 
8,850.646 
(6.772)*** 
8,878.958 
(6.810)*** 
8,729.238 
(6.756)*** 
8,839.471 
(6.713)*** 
8,803.925 
(6.690)*** 
T99 11,049.16 
(8.735)*** 
10,915.529
(8.503)*** 
11,016.922
(8.632)*** 
10,802.985 
(8.510)*** 
9,211.091 
(5.591)*** 
10,862.416
(8.386)*** 
Current Expenditure (-1) 0.051 
(0.632) 
0.058 
(0.715) 
0.057 
(0.712) 
0.034 
(0.432) 
0.093 
(1.141) 
0.061 
(0.750) 
Adj.-R2 0.103 0.102 0.103 0.120 0.092 0.100 
Note: *: 90% significant; **: 95% significant; ***: 99% significant 
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TABLE 4: CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (N*T= 648) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Tax Capacity 0.221 
(0.798) 
0.217 
(0.782) 
-.- -.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (+) -.- -.- 0.165 
(0.568) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (-) -.- -.- 0.141 
(0.452) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Strong Govt. -.- -.- -.- 0.575 
(1.713)* 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Weak Govt. -.- -.- -.- 0.059 
(0.198) 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Election -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.541 
(1.836)* 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * NElection -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.110 
(0.397) 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * Left -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.064 
(0.197) 
Tax Capacity * Right -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.385 
(1.123) 
Current Grants 0.300 
(0.789) 
0.323 
(0.651) 
0.330 
(0.866) 
0.359 
(0.946) 
0.217 
(0.572) 
0.313 
(0.823) 
Capital Grants 1.059 
(13.880)***
1.062 
(13.916)***
1.067 
(13.852)***
1.056 
(13.840)*** 
1.050 
(13.880)*** 
1.061 
(13.919)***
Pop  6,220.785 
(1.337) 
6,476.499 
(1.392) 
6,612.364 
(1.417) 
8,408.640 
(1.801)* 
5,729.031 
(1.238) 
6,259.625 
(1.345) 
Pop2  -92.208 
(-1.178) 
-102.186 
(-1.300) 
-103.907 
(-1.318) 
-117.170 
(-1.487) 
-85.258 
(-1.091) 
-101.794 
(-1.297) 
Pop3 0.470 
(1.076) 
0.535 
(1.217) 
0.543 
(1.231) 
0.5823 
(1.323) 
0.449 
(1.029) 
0.535 
(1.217) 
Pop4  -0.001 
(-1.028) 
-0.001 
(-1.180) 
-0.001 
(-1.191) 
-0.001 
(-1.242) 
-0.001 
(-1.015) 
-0.001 
(-1.181) 
Density -3.569 
(-0.188) 
-1.685 
(-0.089) 
-1.503 
(-0.080) 
-3.607 
(-0.190) 
0.854 
(0.045) 
-1.180 
(-0.062) 
Income -0.008 
(-0.678) 
-0.009 
(-0.703) 
-0.009 
(-0.700) 
-0.008 
(-0.613) 
-0.009 
(-0.738) 
-0.009 
(-0.729) 
Left -.- 1,493.601 
(0.358) 
1,419.362 
(0.340) 
1,041.148 
(0.250) 
1,017.237 
(0.246) 
10,638.718
(0.923) 
Weak Govt. -.- -3,017.416 
(-0.861) 
-3,066.759
(-0.873) 
11,884.254 
(1.240) 
-2,317.140 
(0.246) 
-3,210.309 
(-0.917) 
T95 1,487.531 
(0.675) 
1,434.533 
(0.651) 
1,387.050 
(0.628) 
1,113.025 
(0.505) 
-10,474.86 
(-2.334)*** 
1,531.100 
(0.695) 
T96 -2,998.531
(-1.216) 
-2,294.975 
(-0.890) 
-2,387.119
(-0.921) 
-2,538.803 
(-0.987) 
-1,888.212 
(-0.738) 
-2,209.900 
(-0.858) 
T97 -95.112 
(-0.029) 
656.412 
(0.197) 
601.573 
(0.180) 
225.777 
(0.068) 
1.367.692 
(0.413) 
807.302 
(0.242) 
T98 1,693.938 
(0.304) 
2,468.805 
(0.438) 
2,556.501 
(0.452) 
1,525.561 
(0.271) 
3,505.356 
(0.626) 
2,734.462 
(0.484) 
T99 6,330.934 
(1.361) 
6,980.809 
(1.482) 
7,234.848 
(1.527) 
5,766.173 
(1.228) 
-6,415.776 
(-1.018) 
7,221.930 
(1.532) 
Capital Expenditure (-1) 0.109 
(2.350)*** 
0.113 
(2.417)*** 
0.116 
(2.449)*** 
0.115 
(2.475)*** 
0.117 
(2.534)*** 
0.111 
(2.377)*** 
Adj.-R2 0.264 0.265 0.263 0.267 0280 0.267 
Note: *: 90% significant; **: 95% significant; ***: 99% significant 
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In Tables 3 and 4, we have disintegrated public expenditure between current and 
capital expenditure, respectively. From those estimations, we observe that local 
governments tend to react mainly through reductions in the level of capital 
expenditure (according to Model 1, 0.070 vs. 0.221, though none of these estimates 
is statistically significant). This suggests a relatively greater degree of flexibility of 
capital expenditure than current expenditure (Inman, 1995). With respect to a 
potentially different reaction depending on the degree of fragmentation and the 
closeness to the electoral year, the results obtained in the case of aggregate public 
expenditure are confirmed, though there is no statistically significant difference in 
the case of current expenditure and the electoral year. These results thus cast serious 
doubts on the hypothesis that elections account for the performance of the 
incumbent. Instead the reduction in expenditure might simply reflect an excess of 
investment in the years prior to the elections in such a way that projects tend to be 
finished during the electoral year itself. The positive estimate of capital grants is 
only significant in the equation of capital expenditure. Finally, the variable 
population is only significant with respect to current public expenditure. The impact 
of this variable is non-linear, and follows a similar pattern to the one obtained by 
Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2002). For low levels of population, the relationship is 
negative (evidence of scale-economies); once a minimum has been attained, the 
relationship becomes positive until it reaches a maximum; from then on, the 
relationship tends to become null or even becomes negative again. Finally, the 
lagged endogenous variable is only significant in the case of capital expenditure 
(with a value around 0.11), suggesting the adequacy of the dynamic specification for 
this variable due to the costs of adjustment, which are not present in the case of 
current expenditure, though its estimate is positive as expected. 
 Tax Effort (Table 5): from Model 1, we observe that tax effort negatively depends 
on tax capacity. As suggested in section 2, this means that part of a positive shock in 
tax capacity is "returned" to the citizens through a reduction in tax effort. In 
particular, after an increase of 1 pta. in tax capacity, local governments return 0.25 
ptas. Nevertheless, in contrast with this first result, tax effort is independent of the 
amount of current grants. The functional relationship of tax effort with respect to 
population is identical to the previous one obtained in the estimated equation of 
current expenditure p.c. The other control variables do not exert a significant 
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influence on the level of tax effort. Finally, the estimate of the lagged dependent 
variable (0.335) is greater than in the case of public expenditure, which indicates the 
difficulty in immediately reaching the long run level of tax effort after the adverse 
shock.  
Model 2 provides some evidence of a lower level of tax effort by “weak” 
governments. From the other models, we do not find any different statistically 
significant reaction according to the political situation, with the exception of Model 
6. According to this, after an adverse shock leftist governments tend to increase 
taxes (0.301) much more than rightist governments do (0.182). Once we allow for 
this differential reaction, we find that leftist governments also exert a relatively 
higher level of tax effort independently of the economic situation. Hence, the results 
seem to confirm the hypotheses set up in section 2 concerning “partisan 
preferences”. 
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TABLE 5: TAX EFFORT (N*T= 648)   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Tax Capacity -0.244 
(-12.761)*** 
-0.244 
(-12.889)*** 
-.- -.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (+) -.- -.- -0.243 
(-11.962)*** 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (-) -.- -.- -0.243 
(-11.019)*** 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Strong -.- -.- -.- -0.233 
(-10.048)*** 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Weak -.- -.- -.- -0.249 
(-12.282)*** 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Election -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.244 
(-11.999)*** 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * NElection -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.244 
(-12.897)*** 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * Left -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.301 
(-14.109)***
Tax Capacity * Right -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.182 
(-8.197)*** 
Current Grants 0.010 
(0.402) 
0.013 
(0.506) 
0.013 
(0.497) 
0.014 
(0.551) 
0.015 
(0.567) 
0.009 
(0.377) 
Capital Grants -0.002 
(-0.292) 
-0.002 
(-0.297) 
-0.002 
(-0.301) 
-0.002 
(-0.340) 
-0.002 
(-0.312) 
-0.002 
(-0.389) 
Pop  -1,798.127 
(-5.600)*** 
-1,757.051 
(-5.537)*** 
-1,757.928 
(-5.521)*** 
-1,703.961 
(-5.347)*** 
-1,737.970 
(-5.481)*** 
-1,819.488 
(-5.996)*** 
Pop2  27.044 
(5.021)*** 
26.175 
(4.898)*** 
26.181 
(4.887)*** 
25.743 
(4.805)*** 
26.073 
(4.882)*** 
26.312 
(5.155)*** 
Pop3 -0.120 
(-3.990)*** 
-0.114 
(-3.830)*** 
-0.115 
(-3.822)*** 
-0.113 
(-3.777)*** 
-0.114 
(-3.821)*** 
-0.115 
(-4.035)*** 
Pop4  0.0002 
(3.283)*** 
0.0002 
(3.096)*** 
0.0002 
(3.091)*** 
0.0002 
(3.064)*** 
0.0002 
(3.089)*** 
0.0002 
(3.274)*** 
Density 1.695 
(1.299) 
1.694 
(1.310) 
1.697 
(1.310) 
1.633 
(1.263) 
1.671 
(1.298) 
1.783 
(1.444) 
Income 0.0004 
(0.501) 
0.0004 
(0.494) 
0.0004 
(0.487) 
0.0005 
(0.539) 
0.0005 
(0.549) 
0.0003 
(0.342) 
Left -.- -139.883 
(-0.490) 
-138.028 
(-0.482) 
-148.942 
(-0.522) 
-151.596 
(-0.534) 
3,240.219 
(4.319)*** 
Weak Govt. -.- -418.612 
(-1.759)* 
-416.054 
(-1.747)* 
51.955 
(0.079) 
-414.237 
(-1.746)* 
-500.074 
(-2.199)** 
T95 83.454 
(0.549) 
79.494 
(0.530) 
79.930 
(0.532) 
70.078 
(0.467) 
73.057 
(0.238) 
122.274 
(0.852) 
T96 761.584 
(4.479)*** 
833.349 
(4.751)*** 
834.703 
(4.737)*** 
827.327 
(4.719)*** 
826.944 
(4.728)*** 
870.235 
(5.189)*** 
T97 1,296.012 
(5.824)*** 
1,369.516 
(6.070)*** 
1,370.926 
(6.058)*** 
1,357.287 
(6.020)*** 
1,361.026 
(6.044)*** 
1,446.967 
(6.693)*** 
T98 2,037.481 
(5.366)*** 
2,109.993 
(5.574)*** 
2,109.320 
(5.558)*** 
2,083.365 
(5.513)*** 
2,090.597 
(5.537)*** 
2,238.511 
(6.168)*** 
T99 2,194.459 
(6.786)*** 
2,260.804 
(7.000)*** 
2,255.158 
(6.890)*** 
2,227.411 
(6.900)*** 
2,240.482 
(5.148)*** 
2,385.875 
(7.703)*** 
Tax Effort (-1) 0.335 
(5.071)*** 
0.319 
(4.884)*** 
0.323 
(4.730)*** 
0.319 
(4.886)*** 
0.311 
(4.804)*** 
0.273 
(4.320)*** 
Adj.-R2 0.213 0.224 0.223 0.225 0.229 0.275 
Note: *: 90% significant; **: 95% significant; ***: 99% significant 
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• Deficit (Table 6): according to the results of Model 1, we observe that those 
governments that bear an adverse shock in tax capacity tend to increase their level of 
debt (0.401), though the estimate is not statistically significant. As fae as the other 
variables are concerned, only the estimates of capital and current grants are 
statistically significant. However, it should be recalled that these variables were 
originally excluded from the definition of the deficit (see expression [5]), so the 
value of 0.685 means that after an increase of 1 pta. in the amount of current 
transfers, the local government reduces its level of indebtedness in 0.315 ptas. (i.e., 
0.685-1). In the case of capital transfers, it means that the municipality incurs in a 
deficit of 0.071 ptas. after an increase of 1 pta. in capital grants. This is due to the 
co-funding required by capital transfers. From Model 2, we do not observe any 
difference in the levels of deficit according to the political color or the degree of 
fragmentation of the government. As shown in Model 3, we have not found any 
difference in the variation in the level of debt depending on whether the government 
bears an adverse or positive shock in tax capacity either. 
From Model 4, we observe that “weak” governments tend to delay stabilization after 
an adverse shock, since they increase their level of debt by 0.622 ptas. However, 
“strong” governments tend to adjust immediately, and so do not react by incurring a 
deficit (i.e., the interaction between the dummy Strong Gvt. and Tax Capacity is not 
statistically significant). “Weak” governments do not only tend to delay the 
adjustment, but they also show greater levels of deficit regardless of the state of the 
economy. In particular, ceteris paribus, their deficit is 18,200 ptas. p.c. (approx.) 
greater than the deficit of “strong” governments. Both the theory predicting a delay 
in the fiscal adjustment and the theory predicting higher levels of deficit of “weak” 
governments have therefore been confirmed. 
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TABLE 6: DEFICIT (N*T= 648) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Tax Capacity -0.401 
(-1.400) 
-0.403 
(-1.408) 
-.- -.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (+) -.- -.- -0.439 
(-1.462) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Shock (-) -.- -.- -0.452 
(-1.403) 
-.- -.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Strong Govt. -.- -.- -.- 0.075 
(0.217) 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Weak Govt. -.- -.- -.- -0.622 
(-2.018)** 
-.- -.- 
Tax Capacity * Election -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.052 
(-0.172) 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * NElection -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.520 
(1.819)* 
-.- 
Tax Capacity * Left -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.418 
(-1.238) 
Tax Capacity * Right -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.383 
(-1.079) 
Current Grants 0.685 
(1.745)* 
0.697 
(1.775)* 
0.700 
(1.778)* 
0.740 
(1.889)* 
0.578 
(1.470) 
0.697 
(1.776)* 
Capital Grants 1.071 
(13.453)***
1.074 
(13.479)***
1.076 
(13.435)***
1.067 
(13.397)*** 
1.060 
(13.425)*** 
1.074 
(13.480)***
Pop  1,036.397 
(0.220) 
1,165.514 
(0.247) 
1,268.846 
(0.269) 
3,690.221 
(0.779) 
204.973 
(0.044) 
1,130.450 
(0.240) 
Pop2  -27.048 
(-0.339) 
-35.023 
(-0.436) 
-36.150 
(-0.449) 
-54.761 
(-0.680) 
-13.848 
(-0.173) 
-34.529 
(-0.430) 
Pop3 0.153 
(0.342) 
0.205 
(0.455) 
0.209 
(0.464) 
0.268 
(0.594) 
0.095 
(0.212) 
0.202 
(0.450) 
Pop4  -0.0003 
(-0.343) 
-0.0004 
(-0.464) 
-0.0004 
(-0.470) 
-0.0004 
(-0.545) 
-0.0002 
(-0.244) 
-0.0004 
(-0.460) 
Density -1.320 
(-0.067) 
0.810 
(0.041) 
0.851 
(0.043) 
-1.832 
(-0.093) 
3.723 
(0.191) 
0.749 
(0.038) 
Income -0.004 
(-0.312) 
-0.004 
(-0.336) 
-0.004 
(-0.330) 
-0.003 
(-0.234) 
-0.005 
(-0.373) 
-0.004 
(-0.349) 
Left -.- 2,311.893 
(0.535) 
2,252.510 
(0.521) 
1,726.650 
(0.400) 
1,763.797 
(0.412) 
3,351.556 
(0.280) 
Weak Govt. -.- -1,981.803 
(-0.547) 
-1,983.752
(-0.547) 
18,193.640 
(1.834)* 
-1,285.625 
(-0.358) 
-1,978.984 
(-0.546) 
T95 4,386.763 
(1.926)* 
4,364.426 
(1.917)* 
4,344.893 
(1.905)* 
3,962.041 
(1.742)* 
-8,556.134 
(1.854)* 
4,379.700 
(1.921)* 
T96 24.613 
(0.010) 
596.621 
(0.224) 
553.789 
(0.207) 
293.056 
(0.110) 
1,029.437 
(0.389) 
609.756 
(0.228) 
T97 4,616.459 
(1.380) 
5,232.076 
(1.518) 
5,215.493 
(1.510) 
4,720.146 
(1.373) 
6,029.191 
(1.760)* 
5,256.900 
(1.523) 
T98 8,440.112 
(1.466) 
9,088.790 
(1.560) 
9,145.947 
(1.569) 
7,950.161 
(1.369) 
10,251.568 
(1.772)* 
9,150.281 
(1.568) 
T99 15,377.00 
(3.198)*** 
15,935.305
(3.274)*** 
16,098.521
(3.292)*** 
14,411.383 
(2.969)*** 
1,389.104 
(0.214) 
15,973.677
(3.274)*** 
Deficit (-1) 0.106 
(2.166)** 
0.109 
(2.211)** 
0.110 
(2.218)** 
0.114 
(2.325)** 
0.119 
(2.428)*** 
0.108 
(2.194)** 
Adj.-R2 0.263 0.264 0.263 0.267 0278 0.264 
Note: *: 90% significant; **: 95% significant; ***: 99% significant 
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There is also a difference in the reaction with regard to the accumulation of debt 
depending on whether the government is close or not to an electoral year (Model 5). 
While there is evidence of a delay in the adjustment when the electoral period is not 
close (the estimated increase in debt is 0.520), the fiscal adjustment is instantaneous 
during the electoral year (i.e., there is no increase in the level of debt), although as 
mentioned above, caution should be exercised with respect to these results. Finally, 
Model 6 does not show any difference in the delay of the fiscal adjustment 
depending on the political color of the government, nor different levels of deficit 
(i.e., the dummy variable “Left” is not statistically significant). 
We have therefore shown how important it is to distinguish between municipalities 
according to their political situation. We did not find any other statistically significant 
estimates that permit us to discern the process of fiscal adjustment after an adverse 
shock (see Model 1 of each table). In fact, the key political characteristics to be taken 
into account are the degree of political fragmentation and the electoral period. With the 
exception of tax effort, the estimates are statistically significant and it is possible to 
describe the process of fiscal adjustment only when we allow for a differential reaction 
according to those two political characteristics. 
In Table 7, we have redefined the dummy variable "negative shock". Instead of simply 
defining a "negative shock" as a situation in which the tax capacity of a municipality 
has fallen, a "negative shock" is identified when tax capacity has decreased by 4% (we 
tried lower thresholds, but then there was not a statistically significant different 
reaction). Once we redefine this dummy variable in this way, we obtain an asymmetric 
reaction in the estimated equation of tax effort. In particular, we find that the (negative) 
reaction is greater in absolute values in the case of a negative shock (0.276 vs. 0.263). 
The municipalities thus tend to be more responsive when they have to raise taxes than 
when they have to cut them. 
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TABLE 7: FURTHER EVIDENCE OF ASYMMETRIC REACTIONS (N*T= 648) 
 
 Total  
Expenditure 
 
Current  
Expenditure 
Capital  
Expenditure 
Tax Effort Deficit 
Tax Capacity * Shock (+) 0.300 
(1.022) 
0.049 
(0.784) 
0.199 
(0.696) 
-0.263 
(-13.711)*** 
-0.396 
(-1.343) 
Tax Capacity * Shock (-) 0.279 
(0.856) 
0.037 
(0.536) 
0.179 
(0.566) 
-0.276 
(-12.876)*** 
-0.386 
(-1.180) 
Current Grants 0.706 
(1.807)* 
0.399 
(4.751)*** 
0.327 
(0.860) 
0.013 
(0.499) 
0.694 
(1.769)* 
Capital Grants 1.065 
(13.283)*** 
0.003 
(0.205) 
1.062 
(13.911)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.375) 
1.074 
(13.482)*** 
Pop  1,144.434 
(0.250) 
-5,708.419 
(-5.785)*** 
6,493.245 
(1.395) 
-1,721.532 
(-5.579)*** 
1,158.421 
(0.246) 
Pop2  -24.146 
(-0.305) 
83.225 
(4.945)*** 
-101.503 
(-1.290) 
26.529 
(5.099)*** 
-35.400 
(-0.441) 
Pop3 0.149 
(0.336) 
-0.416 
(-4.389)*** 
0.530 
(1.204) 
-0.118 
(-4.040)*** 
0.207 
(0.460) 
Pop4  -0.0003 
(-0.358) 
0.001 
(4.090)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.167) 
0.0002 
(3.303)*** 
-0.0004 
(-0.469) 
Density -2.830 
(-0.144) 
-0.117 
(-0.028) 
-1.725 
(-0.091) 
1.566 
(1.244) 
0.823 
(0.042) 
Income -0.004 
(-0.318) 
0.003 
(1.172) 
-0.009 
(-0.714) 
0.0004 
(0.464) 
-0.004 
(-0.330) 
Left 1,898.882 
(0.440) 
461.790 
(0.499) 
1,498.223 
(0.359) 
-147.142 
(-0.530) 
2,308.576 
(0.534) 
Weak Govt. -2,025.767 
(-0.563) 
742.322 
(0.958) 
-3,061.558 
(-0.872) 
-428.490 
(-1.850)* 
-1,960.22 
(-0.541) 
T95 4,401.866 
(1.937)* 
2,958.053 
(5.942)*** 
1,426.904 
(0.647) 
88.427 
(0.606) 
4,368.680 
(1.919)* 
T96 1,128.855 
(0.423) 
3,692.163 
(6.187)*** 
-2,318.126 
(-0.899) 
833.446 
(4.885)*** 
611.189 
(0.229) 
T97 6,048.027 
(1.766)* 
5,976.819 
(7.777)*** 
652.691 
(0.196) 
1,397.127 
(6.371)*** 
5,243.094 
(1.523) 
T98 10,347.334 
(1.784)* 
8,964.750 
(6.898)*** 
2,542.585 
(0.450) 
2,191.498 
(5.945)*** 
9,062.656 
(1.555) 
T99 17,144.524 
(5.515)*** 
11,091.342 
(8.739)*** 
7,083.028 
(1.499) 
2,395.038 
(7.561)*** 
15,896.41 
(3.256)*** 
Endogenous variable (-1) 0.100 
(2.023)** 
0.052 
(0.648) 
0.114 
(2.428)*** 
0.283 
(4.297)*** 
0.109 
(2.207)** 
Adj.-R2 0.268 0.105 0.265 0.545 0.264 
Note: *: 90% significant; **: 95% significant; ***: 99% significant 
 
Finally, in Table 8 (short run responses) and Table 9 (long run responses), from the 
results presented in the previous tables, we show the adjustment process after an 
adverse shock of 1 pta. in tax capacity. Apart from the basic case, we have differentiated 
between a positive vs. a negative shock, weak vs. strong governments, election vs. non-
election year, and right-wing vs. left-wing governments’ responses. The most sluggish 
adjustment occurs in the case of tax effort, which implies that it takes about four years 
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to achieve the desired level of tax effort after the shock. As can be seen in Table 9, the 
description of the process of adjustment loses precision in the long run, which might 
due to the short period covered by our panel, and to the long run adjustment of other 
budgetary variables not taken into account in our empirical analysis. 
 
TABLE 8: SHORT RUN RESPONSES TO A DECREASE IN TAX CAPACITY 
 ∇ (Current 
Expenditure) 
∇ (Capital 
Expenditure) 
∇ (Tax  
Capacity) 
∆ (Tax Effort)  ∆(Deficit) 
Basic case -0.070 -0.221 -1 0.244*** +0.401 
 -0.342 -0.355 
Shock (+) +0.047 +0.165 +1 -0.243*** -0.439 
 0.273 0.318 
Shock (-) -0.036 -0.141 -1 0.243*** +0.452 
 -0.244 -0.305 
Strong Govt. -0.190*** -0.575* -1 +0.233*** -0.075 
 -0.807*** -0.842 
Weak Govt. -0.016 -0.059 -1 +0.249*** +0.622** 
 -0.133 -0.129 
Election Year -0.105 -0.541* -1 +0.244*** +0.052 
 -0.709*** -0.704 
No Elect. Year -0.058 -0.110 -1 +0.244*** +0.520* 
 -0.222 -0.236 
Right -0.054 -0.385 -1 +0.182*** +0.383 
 -0.475 -0435 
Left -0.083 -0.064 -1 +0.301*** +0.418 
 -0215 -0.281 
 
TABLE 9: LONG RUN RESPONSES TO A DECREASE IN TAX CAPACITY 
 ∇ (Current 
Expenditure) 
∇ (Capital 
Expenditure) 
∇ (Tax  
Capacity) 
∆ (Tax Effort)  ∆(Deficit) 
Basic case -0.074 -0.248 -1 +0.367*** +0.449 
 -0.380 -0.134 
Shock (+) +0.050 +0.187 +1 -0.359*** -0.493 
 0.304 0.148 
Shock (-) -0.038 -0.160 -1 +0.359*** +0.508 
 -0.272 -0.133 
Strong Govt. -0.197*** -0.650* -1 +0.342*** +0.085 
 -0.898*** -0.573 
Weak Govt. -0.017 -0.067 -1 +0.366*** +0.702** 
 -0.148 0.068 
Election Year -0.116 -0.613* -1 +0.354*** +0.059 
 -0.807*** -0.587 
No Elect. Year -0.064 -0.125 -1 +0.354*** +0.590* 
 -0.253 -0.056 
Right -0.057 -0.433 -1 +0.250*** +0.429 
 -0.526 -0321 
Left -0.088 -0.072 -1 +0.414*** +0.469 
 -0238 -0.117 
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4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have characterized the process of fiscal adjustment of a representative 
group of municipalities of the province of Barcelona after a shock in their level of 
(potential) tax revenues, i.e. tax capacity. However, we have not been able to obtain an 
average behavior, as the process of adjustment is very much influenced by the political 
context within each municipality. 
On the one hand, those governments qualified as "weak" in the sense that they do not 
have a majority of seats in the parliament of their city council thus tend to delay the 
unavoidable fiscal adjustment (so increasing their level of debt). On the other hand, 
leftist governments tend to react more strongly through increases in the level of tax 
effort than rightist governments, which instead tend to reduce to a greater extent the 
level of expenditure, mainly capital expenditure. We have also found an asymmetrical 
reaction to a negative and a positive shock in tax capacity in the case of tax effort. In 
absolute values, the reaction is relatively lower when the municipality suffers a positive 
shock in tax capacity, i.e. local governments are relatively reluctant to decrease taxes. 
Finally, adopting a dynamic empirical analysis has permitted us to identify an especially 
slow adjustment for the variable "tax effort", as it takes about four years to attain the 
desired long run level.  
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